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Summary findings
McKibbin  and Martin identify  as the primary  cause  of  alone,  have  caused  an adjustment  crisis  of this magnitude
the East  Asian  crisis  a fundamental  reassessment  of the  - although  they could have  helped trigger the crisis.
profitability  of investments  in the region.  More important,  expectations  of future growth in
They  identify  a number of secondary  shocks  as well,  returns  to the corporate  sector began  to fall. Declines  in
including  interest  risk premia,  monetary  expansion,  and  asset  valuations  caused  major  shifts  in investment
declines  in output brought about by failures  of the  portfolios,  and the consequences  of asset market  shocks
financial  market.  were compounded  by secondary  shocks  associated  with
Unlike  the Latin  American  crisis  of the 1980s,  the East  the abrupt shift  to floating  rates,  concerns  about the
Asian  crisis  did not reflect  commodity  price shocks,  large  credibility  of government  policies,  weaknesses  in
changes  in world interest  rates, fiscal  imbalances,  or  financial  sectors,  and inadequacies  in the mechanisms  for
inflationary  shocks.  It involved  large-scale  borrowing  corporate  restructuring  and liquidation.
abroad,  but by the private  sector  rather than the  McKibbin  and Martin  use a forward-looking  modeling
government  - and for the normally  well-regarded  framework  to capture some of the major interactions
purpose  of funding  capital investment.  between  asset markets,  output, and trade in the countries
It seems  unlikely  that terms of trade shocks  or changes  worst hit by the crisis.  They  find that the model  is able to
in exchange  rates due to pegging  to the dollar  could,  capture  the main features  of the crisis.
This  paper-a  product  of Trade, Development  Research  Group-is  part of a larger  effort in the group  to understand  the
links between  trade and growth. Copies of the paper are available  free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW,
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www.worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/Workpapers/home.html.  Will  Martin  may  be  contacted  at  wmartinl
(worldbank.org.  August 1999. (57 pages)
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1.  Introduction
The East  Asian crisis of 1997-8  is different  from  most of the earlier  structural
adjustment  crises  that have affected  developing  countries.  Unlike  the Latin American
crisis  of the 1980s,  it does  not reflect either  commodity  price shocks  or large changes  in
world interest  rates. Nor does  it reflect  the fiscal imbalances  and inflationary  shocks  that
have been central  to many other crises.  It involved  large-scale  borrowing  abroad,  but by
the private sector  rather than the government,  and for the normally  well-regarded  purpose
of funding  capital  investment.
Since the early 1  990s,  the pattern of financial  flows  between developed  and
developing  countries  has changed  significantly,  with private flows  to developing
countries  expanding  six-fold  between 1990  and 1996  (World  Bank 1997).  These flows
have  had an enormously  positive  impact  on the world economy,  facilitating  very rapid
growth  in East  Asia and lifting  millions  out of poverty.  Unfortunately,  it is now  clear that
these financial  flows are more  complex  to manage  than  has previously  been  realized,  and
new techniques  are needed  to deal with the instability  with which  they can be associated.
Some  of the conventional  shocks  that require  structural  adjustment  can be seen on
economic  radar screens.  We know, for example,  that excessive  government  spending  will
lead to disaster,  and can offer suggestions  for dealing  with the inevitable  turbulence  when
it hits. Some shocks,  such as commodity  price shocks,  are difficult  to see on the
economic  radar, but we have well-defined  flight rules for dealing  with them. The shocks
that hit East Asia are like Clear Air Turbulence-the shocks  are invisible  and we don't
have good flight plans  for dealing  with them.
Given  the increasing  integration  of world capital  markets,  it seems  likely  that
more shocks  like  the ones that hit East  Asia lie in store for both developed  and
developing  countries.  It is therefore  particularly  important  that we learn from the current
t Slightly  revised version of "The East Asia Crisis: Investigating  Causes and Policy Responses"  Working  Paper in
Trade and Development  #98/6, Economics  Department,  Research  School of Pacific  and Asian Studies,  Australian
National  University.  We wish  to thank  Francis Ng for his excellent  assistance  with this study.
1crisis and use the experience to develop better techniques for identifying and dealing with
shocks of this type.
Our first objective in this paper is to identify some of the key shocks that affected
the East Asian crisis countries. We consider shocks that are external to the region, and
those that are internal to the affected countries. Once the initial shocks hit, the situation
changed substantially and there were important responses by both the private sector and
the government. These responses, in turn, had important second-round impacts. We use
the Asia-Pacific G-Cubed model to assess the impacts of both the primary and secondary
shocks on these economies. After forming an assessment of these impacts, we examine
some possible policy responses.
To keep the analysis manageable, we focus on the three most severely affected of
the crisis countries-Thailand,  Indonesia and Korea .
2.  Shock Identification
An extensive literature has now emerged on the causes of the East Asian crisis.
While extremely informative, much of this literature focuses on relationships between
endogenous variables, such as domestic interest rates, exchange rates, and current
account imbalances rather than on exogenous shocks that set off or exacerbated the crisis.
We first consider the shocks that could plausibly be regarded as exogenous to the crisis
countries, and only then turn to the responses in policies and by financial institutions that
may have compounded the initial shock. The three main types of primary shocks
considered are: terms of trade shocks; appreciation of the US dollar under a currency peg;
and downward revisions in the anticipated profitability of investment.
A key question in examining a crisis of this nature is whether the crisis was purely
the result of a financial shock such as a bank run or disorderly workout (Radelet and
Sachs 1998), or from a change in economic fundamentals. While the causes of a purely
financial panic are typically difficult to observe, at least some changes in economic
For an overview of the conditions leading up to the crisis in each of these countries see Warr (1998)
on Thailand, McLeod (1998) on Indonesia and Smith (1998) on Korea.
2fundamentals can be observed and used to identify potential causes, and hence to focus
the analysis.
a.  Potential Shocks to Fundamentals
Examination of the data for the affected countries does not reveal major terms of
trade shocks that might plausibly have created a need for structural adjustment in all of
the affected countries (Hoekman and Martin 1998). In Korea there was a substantial fall
in the terms of trade during the lead up to the crisis, a deterioration of 27 percent in the
three years up to late 1997. While this is a large decline, it seems likely to have been due
in large part to improvements in the production technology for goods such as
semiconductors. If we were able to make adequate adjustments for these improvements in
technology, it seems likely that the adverse impact of this deterioration in the terms of
trade would be substantially smaller than would be suggested by the raw terms of trade
numbers. In Indonesia, the terms of trade appear to have deteriorated in 1994, but
appeared to recover by early 1997, and only fell substantially below trend in the third
quarter of 1997, following the onset of the crisis.
Another external shock that has been widely viewed as a potential contributing
factor to the crisis was the major shift in the yen/dollar exchange rate since 1995. The
depreciation of the yen has greatly increased the competitiveness of Japanese exports,
and raised the cost within Japan of imports from the East Asian developing countries.
Given the pattern of export similarities, this shock might have been expected to have a
disproportionately large impact on Korea, which competes with Japan in a range of
manufactured goods. The depreciation of the yen was also associated with a large
expansion in Japan's trade surplus that might have compounded the impact on the East
Asian countries. However, if the change in the yen dollar exchange rate were large
enough to be the primary cause of the shock, then one would generally expect it to have
had a major adverse impact on the terms of trade of the affected countries.
The defacto  pegging of the exchange rates of these countries to the US dollar has
widely been viewed as a source of adjustment pressures and a catalyst for the crash. A
useful framework for assessing the potential importance of a pegged exchange rate is
3provided by Montiel (1997). This consists of decomposing the nominal effective
exchange rate into a component due to movements of the country's currency against the
reference currency (in this case the US dollar), and a second component measuring
changes in the value of the dollar against the currencies of the country's trading partners2.
Figure 1. Terms of trade changes in the three crisis countries.
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Sources:  South  Korea (Intemational Financial Statistics); Indonesia (Bank Indonesia); Thailand (Bank of Thailand).
The CPI for each country was used as the price indicator for that country. The two
components of exchange rate changes are written as local currency per US$ (XRI) and
US$ per unit of trading partner currency (ERI). Thus, a fall in either index is an
appreciation. A decline in ERI would indicate an appreciation of the dollar against the
currencies of the country's main trading partners and, hence, a potential competitiveness
2  The calculations were done using the trade weights for the largest 20 trading partners in 1995 and
follow the methodology set out in Appendix A.
4problem. The results of this decomposition are presented for Thailand in Figure 2 for the
period from 1990 to June 1997, immediately prior to the onset of the crisis.
For Thailand at least, Figure 2 makes it clear that pegging to the US dollar caused
some appreciation of the nominal effective exchange rate between 1995 and the middle
of 1997. The modest increase in the Baht price of US dollars was far smaller than the fall
in the price of trading partner currencies in terms of dollars. However, the resulting
depreciation of the nominal effective exchange rate from a peak of 107 to a low of 96 is
less than ten percent. Further, the 1995 peak was so short-lived that it hardly seems likely
to have formed a base from which appreciation would constitute a problem. The real
appreciation of the Baht shown in Figure 3 was somewhat larger than the nominal
appreciation, because of the higher rate of inflation in Thailand than in its trading
partners, but the appreciation from peak to trough was still only 13 percent. From the
base value of 100 it was only eight percent. Since only part of this increase could be
attributed to the policy of pegging to the dollar, this much-heralded factor does not
appear to have been particularly important as a source of shocks, although it could still
have been important as a source of rigidity after some other shock hit the Thai economy.
Figure 2. Changes in Thailand's Nominal Effective Exchange Rate
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5Figure 3. Changes in Thailand's Real Effective Exchange Rate
Real Effective Exchange Rate: Thailand
100.00
-4-*-NEER
-U-*RPI 95.00  REz
90.00
85.00
80.00  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..  . . . . .
1990M1  1990M9  1991M5  1992M1  1992M9 1993M5  1994M1  1994M9  1995M5  1996M1  1996M9  1997M5
For Indonesia, the corresponding changes in nominal and real effective exchange
rates were also relatively small, as is evident from Figures 4 and 5. The appreciation of
the rupiah weighted by Indonesia's trade after 1995 was relatively small, and was largely
offset by the continuing nominal depreciation of the rupiah against the dollar. From a
brief peak of 109 in mid 1995, the real effective exchange rate appreciated to 96 in June
of 1997. However, this was only five percent stronger than the average of 101 prevailing
over the period from 1990 to mid-1  997. It seems implausible that rigidity of the peg to
the US dollar was a major source of shocks to the Indonesian economy, although it could
have been very important for the nature of the nature and severity of the adjustment after
the economy was hit by another shock.
6Figure  4. Changes  in the Nominal Effective Exchange  Rate:  Indonesia
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Figure  5. Changes in the Real Effective Exchange  Rate:  Indonesia.
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7In Korea, a peg to the US dollar would have resulted in appreciation of the
effective exchange rate, as is evident from the behavior of the nominal exchange rate
indicator (ERI) series. However, the continual depreciation of the won against the dollar
resulted in a continuing depreciation of the nominal effective exchange rate. This
depreciation of the nominal exchange rate outweighed the inflation differential, causing
the real effective exchange rate to depreciate from 95 to 108 during the year prior to the
crisis. Clearly, exchange rate pegging does not appear to have been the source of the
problems that emerged in Korea.
Figure 6. Changes in  the Nominal Effective Exchange Rate: Korea
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Our results on real exchange rate appreciation are similar to those obtained using
the standard IMF International Financial Statistics measures of real effective exchange
rates. They differ from those of Radelet and Sachs (1998, p13), who find evidence of real
appreciation exceeding 25 percent between 1990 and 1997 in the three countries we
consider. The difference seems to arise from Radelet and Sach's use of only developed-
country trading partners. Some such long term appreciation relative to mature, slow
growing economies would be expected because of the long term trend rise in the prices of
8nontraded goods in growing economies (Falvey and Gemmell 1991). Further, a rise over
such a long period is unlikely to constitute a shock.
Figure 7. Changes in the Real Effective Exchange Rate: Korea
Real Effective Exchange Rates: Korea
110.00
108.00
106.00  h  f 
104.00V~M
102.00  AA  i v 
-R-PN  EER





1990M1  1990M9  1991M5  1992M1  1992M9 1993M5  1994M1  1994M9  1995M5  1996M1 1996M9  1997M5
The fact that the pegged exchange rate regimes do not appear to have been a
primary source of shocks does not mean that they did not play a role in the transmission
of the crisis. If a large shock elsewhere in the economy required a large adjustment in the
exchange rate, then the fixed rate system may have lacked the flexibility to respond
sufficiently rapidly.
Within the affected countries, a potentially important shock appears to have been
a sharp downturn in expectations about the future profitability of investments in these
countries. This downturn in expectations might have had a range of sources. Krugman
(1998) attributes earlier, higher, expectations to an expectation that investment failures
would be bailed out. Others have argued that investment has been excessive, and that
investment returns have therefore been declining, perhaps following the profile of
diminishing returns to capital outlined in Young (1994) and Krugman (1994). While
possible, such a decline in the efficiency of investment would have tended to push down
9both the return on capital and the price of capital. In Thailand, the ratio of the price of
capital to its return (as proxied by the price-earnings ratio for  the stock exchange) began
to decline well around the beginning of 1996, a full year and a half before the crisis. In
Indonesia and Korea, however, the fall was more or less contemporaneous with the onset
of the crisis in Thailand.
Figure 8. Changes in Price-Earnings Ratios in the Stock Markets of Crisis Countries
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Source: International Finance Corporation, Emerging Markets Database.
A decline in the price of capital relative to its earnings might have a number of
causes. It might, for example, be due to an increase in the expected rate of inflation. As
Feldstein (1980) has shown, such an increase might be expected to reduce the after-tax
return on capital because it reduces the real value of the tax depreciation allowances
associated with capital investment. Another obvious potential cause of this reduction
would be a reduction in the rate of growth in returns to capital. Consider the standard
capitalization formula for an infinitely-lived asset,
V = Al(r - g)
10where V is the capital value, A is the annual return to the capital; r is the discount rate;
and g is the growth rate of the return to capital.  From this formula, it is very clear that the
valuation of the capital stock is potentially very sensitive to the expected growth rate of
returns.
The apparently robust Price-Earnings ratios in pre-crisis Korea depicted in Figure
8. are potentially misleading. In fact, stock prices in both Korea and Thailand began
falling more or less contemporaneously from the beginning of 1996 (McKibbin 1998).
However, the overall rate of real growth in Korea remained over 7 percent in 1996,
implying that the decline in corporate earnings was a leading indicator for the subsequent
decline in the growth rate of the economy as a whole. Only in Indonesia did corporate
earnings and stock prices remain robust until the onset of the crisis.
b.  Secondary Shocks
Once the crises began in these countries, other factors that could have exacerbated
the impact of the initial shock came into play. These shocks included: (i) the emergence
of risk premia on loans to the affected countries, and the related reluctance of creditors to
roll over short term credits, (ii) expectations that governments would loosen monetary
policy to reduce the impact of the shock on output and employment, and (iii) negative
productivity shocks resulting from a lack of availability of credit as banks tried to restore
their balance sheets.
Concerns about the ability of firms and governments to repay their debts given the
devaluations of their domestic currencies can gave rise to sometimes substantial risk
premia. These risk premia raise domestic interest rates, and lead to exchange rate
depreciation (McKibbin 1998). The impact of the emergence of a risk premium in
country i is most readily seen using the uncovered interest parity condition:
(1)  r'  =  r,U +  E,Ae,  +  r,
where r/ is the rate of return on government securities in country i; rtu  the interest rate on
comparable securities in the United States (or some other reference country); E, Ae, is the
11expected depreciation of the nominal exchange rate in time t; and  ',  is the risk
premium reflecting the market's perceptions of the risk differential associated with the
securities issued by country i's government.
Clearly, when the economy reaches an equilibrium in which expected
depreciation of its currency is zero, its interest rate will be higher by the risk premium
associated with its securities. During the transition path from the initial shock to the final
equilibrium, the domestic interest rate and the risk premium will together determine the
expected path of the exchange rate. If r,
1 + /A  exceeds the domestic interest rate, then the
exchange rate will undergo an anticipated appreciation.
Another important factor in the aftermath of the initial crashes appears to have
been uncertainty about the response of monetary policy. Given the weak state of the
banking sectors in a number of the countries, and the shocks to the accounts of banks
from devaluation, governments were under strong pressure to, at least partly, validate the
shock resulting from the initial devaluation. Even if governments plan to maintain a tight
monetary policy, they are likely to have low credibility in this situation, as in the case of
disinflation, where high interest rates frequently emerge (Kaminsky and Leiderman
Figure 9. Money supply growth in the three crisis countries
Money Supply (M2) in the Crisis Countries






121998). With forward-looking expectations and a freely floating rate, even expectations of
monetary expansion can be expected to cause a jump depreciation of the exchange rate
(Wilson 1979). Where monetary policy was, in fact, loosened to deal with the crisis in the
banking sector, an even larger depreciation of the rate would be expected. As Figure
illustrates, the increase of 50 percent in the money supply in Indonesia in late 1997 and
early 1998 is in quite strong contrast with the relatively tight control of monetary policies
maintained in the other crisis countries.
Radelet and Sachs (1998), Chang and Velasco (1998), Corsetti, Pesenti and
Roubini (1998) and McLeod and Garnaut (1998) all focus on the nature of the financial
meltdown, and draw out its potential consequences. From this work, it is clear that a great
deal depends upon whether the shocks are viewed as rational responses to adverse
shocks, or as the consequence of blind panic. If the financial meltdown is the result of an
asset grab by creditors, rather than a fundamental problem of insolvency, then it is likely
to have only a short-term impact on productivity as long as an orderly workout can be put
in place. The short term adverse impact on the productivity of the economy might,
however, be substantial if profitable firms are denied credit by the capital adequacy
problems of the banks.
There is a serious simultaneity problem in capturing the interaction of the
financial and macroeconomic impacts of the financial sector crisis. A rise in interest
rates, for instance, will have an adverse impact on the balance sheets of borrowing firms
and may throw some of them into default. If this, in turn, leads to a rise in the risk
premium on lending to this country, this is likely to have two adverse second-round
impacts on the balance sheets of these firms. The first adverse impact would be through a
rise in interest rates resulting directly from the rise in the risk premium. The second
possible adverse impact-affecting  only those firms with unhedged foreign currency
borrowings-would  follow from the devaluation induced by the rise in the risk premium.
Perhaps the best that we can do within the framework of our analysis is to assign
rough orders of magnitude to the direct impacts of the second-round financial sector
shocks, and assess their impacts for the macroeconomic adjustments needed to emerge
from the crisis. With the forward-looking macroeconomic framework that we utilize, we
13can form some assessment of the size of the adjustments required over the medium-term
recovery horizon.
One measure of the size of the risk premium associated with the financial crisis is
provided by the changes in the prices of US dollar denominated bonds issued by the
governments in the crisis countries. Changes in the prices of these bonds can be
translated into changes in the internal rate of return demanded by international investors
from  government securities in the crisis countries. Comparison of the internal rate of
return on bonds with the internal rate of return on US bonds of similar maturity yields a
measure of the risk premium on financial assets in the crisis countries 3. This measure of
the risk premium seems likely to be much more reliable than one generated by adjusting
the yield on domestic securities for anticipated exchange rate depreciation-simply
because we have no reliable series for anticipated exchange rate depreciation. Estimates
of changes in the risk premia for the two crisis countries for which data are available
Figure 10. Risk premia on 10 year government bonds
Risk  Premia  for  Indonesia  and  Thailand
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Source:  World  Bank.
3The risk premium associated with the financial assets of particular companies will differ from that on
government securities. These additional risk premia over that on government securities will generally
be positive.
14were kindly supplied by Himmat Kalsi of the World Bank. These estimates are shown in
Figure 10.
The initial analysis in this paper focuses on the impact of the shocks identified.
We consider first the impact of reductions in the expected profitability of investments in
the country. We then consider the impacts of the financial sector shocks that result from
the initial shocks-the  emergence of a risk premium; monetary policy responses and
anticipated monetary policy responses; and productivity losses associated with financial
sector turmoil.  To trace through the impacts of these shocks, we use a general
equilibrium multi-country framework that can take into account the impacts of financial
market shocks on the real economy, including impacts for exchange rates, trade balances,
GDP, consumption and investment.
3.  A  General Equilibrium Multi-Country Framework
The crisis appears to involve shocks emanating from the financial markets,
transmitted to the real sector through changes in exchange rates and macroeconomic
balances. Thus, the analysis needs to incorporate both asset and product markets. Because
so much depends on expectations about future returns, and changes in variables like
exchange rates that depend on expectations of future developments in asset and goods
markets, it is desirable to be able to include forward-looking expectations. Because the
impacts of the shocks are likely to be very different across sectors, it is desirable that the
analysis be able to distinguish impacts on different sectors.
The G-Cubed (Asia Pacific ) multi-country model was used for the analysis. It is
based on the G-Cubed model developed in McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1992, 1999). It
combines the intertemporal macroeconomic approach taken in the MSG2 model of
McKibbin and Sachs (1991) with the disaggregated, econometrically-estimated,
intertemporal general equilibrium model of the US economy by Jorgenson and Wilcoxen
(1989).  By using an intertemporal general equilibrium model, we are able to build on the
analysis of the trade shocks undertaken by Liu, Noland, Robinson and Wang (1998)
using a static computable general equilibrium model.
15The G-Cubed model was constructed to contribute to the current policy debate on
global warming, trade policy and international capital flows, but has many features that
make it useful for answering a range of issues in environmental regulation,
microeconomic, macroeconomic and trade policy questions.  It is a world model with
substantial regional disaggregation and sectoral detail. In addition, countries and regions
are linked both temporally and intertemporally through trade and financial markets. The
explicit treatment of financial flows has been shown to be important for analyzing the
response to trade liberalization (see McKibbin (1996)) but it is absolutely crucial for
analyzing the consequences of financial shocks such as the re-evaluation of risk. G-
Cubed contains a strong foundation for analysis of both short run macroeconomic policy
analysis as well as long run growth consideration of alternative macroeconomic policies.
Intertemporal budget constraints on households, governments and nations (the
latter through accumulations of foreign debt) are imposed.  To accommodate these
constraints, forward looking behavior is incorporated in consumption and investment
decisions.  Unlike the MSG2 model, the G-Cubed model also contains substantial
sectoral detail.  This permits analysis of environmental and trade policies which tend to
have their largest effects on small segments of the economy.  By integrating sectoral
detail with the macroeconomic features of the MSG2 model, G-Cubed can be used to
consider the long run costs of alternative environmental regulations and trade policy
changes yet at the same time consider the macroeconomic implications of these policies
over time.  The response of monetary and fiscal authorities in different countries can have
important effects in the short to medium run which, given the long lags in physical capital
and other asset accumulation, can be a substantial period of time.  Overall, the model is
designed to provide a bridge between computable general equilibrium models and
macroeconomic models by integrating the more desirable features of both approaches.
The G-Cubed (Asia Pacific) model differs from the G-Cubed model because of the focus
on the Asia-Pacific region as well as by having 6 sectors compared to 12 for G-CUBED.
The theoretical structure is essentially the same.
The key features of the G-Cubed (Asia Pacific) model are summarized in Table 1.
The country and sectoral breakdown of the model are given in Table 2.  The model
consists of eighteen economic regions (the new version (29) used in this paper also
16includes India and New Zealand) with six sectors in each region (there are also two
additional sectors in each region that produce the capital good for firms and the
household capital good). The regions in the model can be divided into two groups: 15
core countries/regions and three others. For the core regions, the internal macroeconomic
structure as well as the external trade and financial linkages are completely specified in
the model.
Table 1: Summary of the Main Features of AP-G-CUBED
*  Specification of the demand and supply sides of  economies;
*  Integration of real and financial markets of these economies with explicit arbitrage
linkage real and financial rates of return;
*  Intertemporal accounting of stocks and flows of real resources and financial assets;
*  Imposition of intertemporal budget constraints so that agents and countries cannot
forever borrow or lend without undertaking the required resource transfers necessary
to service outstanding liabilities;
*  Short run behavior is a weighted average of neoclassical optimizing behavior based
on expected future income streams and Keynesian current income;
*  The real side of the model is dis-aggregated to allow for production of multiple goods
and services within  economies;
*  International trade in goods, services and financial assets;
*  Full short run and long run macroeconomic closure with macro dynamics at an annual
frequency around a long run Solow/Swan/Ramsey neoclassical growth model.
e  The model is solved for a full rational expectations equilibrium at an annual
frequency from 1996 to 2070.
Each core economy or region in the model consists of several economic agents:
households, the government, the financial sector and the 6 production sectors listed in
table 2. Each of these economic actors interact in a variety of markets, both domestic and
foreign.
The eighteen regions in the model are linked by flows of goods and assets.  Flows
of goods are determined by import demands for final consumption as well as for
intermediate inputs.  Trade imbalances are financed by flows of financial assets between
countries. It is assumed (based on calibrating the model to a 1996 base year) that existing
wedges between rates of return in different economies are generated by various
restrictions that generate a risk premium on country denominated assets.  These wedges
are calculated using a technique outlined in section 4 below. They are assumed to be
17exogenous during the simulations. Thus in general when the model is simulated, the
induced changes in expected rates of return in different countries generate flows of
financial capital reacting to return differentials at the margin.
Table 2. Overview of the G-CUBED Model
Regions:  Sectors:
United States  Energy
Japan  Mining
Australia  Agriculture
New Zealand  Non Durable Manufacturing











Oil Exporting Developing Countries
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union
Other Developing Countries
Agents  Markets
Households  Final Goods
Firms  Services





International capital flows are assumed to be composed of portfolio investment,
direct investment and other capital flows. These alternative forms of capital flows are
perfectly substitutable ex ante, adjusting to the expected rates of return across economies
and across sectors. Within an economy, the expected return to each type of asset (i.e.
bonds of all maturities, equity for each sector etc.) are arbitraged, taking into account the
costs of adjusting physical capital stock and allowing for exogenous risk premia. Because
18physical capital is costly to adjust, any inflow of financial capital that is invested in
physical capital (i.e. direct investrnent) will also be costly to shift once it is in place.  The
decision to invest in physical assets is based on expected rates of return. However, if
there is an unanticipated shock then ex-post returns could vary significantly. Total net
capital flows for each economy in which there are open capital markets are equal to the
current account position of that country. The global net flows of private capital are
constrained to zero.
4.  Experiments and Results
Since we remain fundamentally uncertain about the magnitudes of the shocks
involved, we use the model in experimental mode, examining the impact of each type of
shock on the economy, with a view to making some qualitative assessment of the nature
of itsimpacts. We consider first the asset market shock which appears to have contributed
heavily to the crisis. Then, we consider the risk premia and monetary policy shocks that
appear to have contributed to exacerbating it. Finally, we consider the adverse impacts of
the financial meltdown on the perfornance  of the crisis economies through factors such
as a lack of available credit for production, or inadequate institutions for speedy
resolution of problems created by firm illiquidity through either workouts or liquidation
(Goldstein, Rogoff and Johnson 1998).
a.  An Anticipated Decline in Profitability of Investments in Thailand
The first experiment is an anticipated reduction in the return on investment
resulting from a fall in total factor productivity in the country concerned. Because of the
requirement that the model reach a long run steady state solution, we are unable to
implement a permanent change in the rate of productivity growth. For this reason, we
introduce the shock as a decline in expected productivity that is 0.5 percent in 1997, 1.0
percent in 1998, and then declines by 1 percent per year until, in 2002, the level is 5
percent below what it would otherwise have been. In terms of the growth rate of
productivity, this is a fall in the growth rate of productivity of 0.5 percent in 1997 and
1998, and 1 percent per year until 2002, when the growth rate of productivity returns to
19baseline. This experiment seems most appropriate for Thailand, where the fall in asset
prices preceded the fall in returns. However, with some adjustment to the time path, it
would seem to be reasonably appropriate in Korea and Indonesia.
The experiment is undertaken relative to a benchmark growth path for the model.
The rate of growth of the money supply is treated as exogenous in the simulation,
assuming that the government does not respond to shocks to the price level resulting from
the shock.
Some key results for the impacts of the productivity shock in Thailand alone on
key variables in Thailand are presented in Figures 1  1(a) to 11  (d). A useful way to
understand the results is to begin with the sharp initial depreciation of the exchange rate.
The nominal exchange rate undergoes a jump depreciation of 20 percent in the first year,
and continues to depreciate for the next five years, after which it begins to appreciate
towards a long run equilibrium that is around 5 percent below the benchmark rate.
Nominal and real interest rates rise in the first few years because the exchange rate
depreciation raises the prices of tradable goods. With the money supply unchanged, this
reduces the real money supply, and leads to higher interest rates in the short term, despite
the decline in real incomes. After several years of adjustment, however, the combination
of the decline in real income, and a higher rate of inflation associated with continuing
exchange rate depreciation result in real interest rates that are as much as 3 percentage
points below the baseline levels.
The decline in current and expected future returns to capital causes a fall in the
prices of capital goods. This decline in capital goods prices, and in the Tobin's  q measure
of the incentive to invest, causes a 10 percent decline in investment in the first year. This
initial decline in investment is sharper than the long-run reduction because the capital
stock before the shock is larger than that required after the shock. As the adjustment
process proceeds, investment picks up, led by investment in the sectors more oriented to
traded goods production that benefit from the real devaluation. In the new steady state,
investment is 2.3 percent below its baseline level.
The decline in wealth resulting from the decline in productivity leads to a sharp
decline in consumption in the model. The model contains a combination of forward-
looking agents whose consumption decisions are based on expected future wealth, and
20others whose decisions are based on their income levels (see McKibbin and Sachs 1991
for a detailed discussion). For both groups, the shock reduces consumption levels sharply
in the early periods of the adjustment process. Over time, the reductions in consumption
and investment decline until, in the new steady state, they are reduced by roughly the
same amount as Gross National Product.
Real GDP falls substantially in the model. Part of the decline is due directly to the
reduction in productivity, and part to an initial fall in employment which peaks at 8.2
percent in 2002. Because the labor market is assumed to be relatively flexible,
unemployment levels fall relatively quickly after the shock has passed. Over time,
however, the initial decline in real GDP is increased by the effects of the fall in
investment. GDP continues to fall for as long as the decline in productivity occurs, and
then begins to recover gradually, as investment returns to higher levels. In the long run,
GDP is around 12 percent below the baseline level-a  considerably larger fall than the
decline in productivity that set off the adjustment. The much greater fall in GDP than in
productivity reflects the reduction in the ability of the country to compete for
international investment resources. The fall in GNP, and hence in real investment and
consumption, is considerably smaller than the fall in GDP because of the reduction in the
need to service international debt.
The real exchange rate variable reports the ratio of the prices of domestically
produced goods relative to the price of imports from other countries. Since the Armington
(1969) assumption employed in the model treats the prices of domestically-produced
goods and exports as identical, this variable can also be interpreted as the terms of trade.
This real exchange rate/terms of trade deteriorates substantially because the decline in
domestic absorption (consumption plus investment) results in a sharp increase in net
exports. Despite this decline in the terms of trade, the improvement in the balance of
trade is very substantial, improving by around ten percent of GDP in the first year, and
rising to 14 percent above the baseline after four years as the decline in consumption
demand increases.
The results of the productivity shock for Thailand include many of the features of
the actual outcome during the crisis. A sizable depreciation of the exchange rate, a fall in
21Figure  11: Impacts  of an Anticipated  Decline in Productivity  in Thailand
Thailand: GDP, Consumption and Investment  Indonesia: Trade and Current Account Balance
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_~~~~Kra  Noia  an  Rea  Efetv  ExhneRtsKra:Ra_neetRtinvestment and consumption, a deterioration in the terms of trade, rises in nominal and
real interest rates, and a rapid turnabout in the balance of trade have been important
features of the Thai experience since the beginning of the crisis. Clearly, however, this
combination of a small concurrent reduction in productivity and a larger anticipated
reduction does not capture either the full extent of the reduction in output during the first
year after the shock.
The model results for the impact of the anticipated productivity shock in Thailand
provide interesting insights into the contagion issue. The shock considered produces an
initial nominal depreciation of over 20 percent in Thailand, rising to almost 40 percent as
the productivity decline actually occurs. The effects of this sizable shock on the (assumed
floating) exchange rates of Korea and Indonesia are, however, extremely small. The
Indonesian Rupiah depreciates by around 0.2 percent. The Korean currency actually
appreciates-- initially by 0.2 percent, rising subsequently to 0.4 percent.
The explanation for these initially surprising results seem to lie in the dual nature
of the response of the Thai economy to this shock. Within the current account, the trade
impacts of the shock are adverse for its competitors. On the global capital account,
however, Thailand is substantially reducing its demands for capital as its current account
strengthens. In the case of Indonesia, the trade account effects dominate and the exchange
rate depreciates. By contrast, in the case of Korea, the capital account dominates and the
exchange rate strengthens.
Clearly, however, these results suggest that the pure "contagion" effects operating
through trade and capital market linkages were very weak. They suggest that the spread
of the crisis from Thailand must have been due to changes in the perceptions of market
participants about conditions in the other markets, rather than about domino effects
resulting from the initial crisis.
The impacts on Korea of the same profile of anticipated decline in productivity in
Korea are presented in Figure 12. The qualitative nature of the adjustment to the shock is
broadly similar to Thailand. However, the magnitudes of adjustment required are
generally substantially lower for Korea than for Thailand. Part of this difference is
probably due to the higher investment rates prevailing in Thailand than in Korea or
Indonesia prior to the crisis. Another important source of difference is the heavier
24Figure  13:  Impacts  of an  Anticipated  Decline  in Productivity  in Indonesia
Indonesia:  GDP,  Consumption  and  Investment  Indonesia:  Trade  and  Current  Account  Balance
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tREER  Rsk premium shock  of Indonesiareliance of Thailand on foreign-currency denominated debt. Following the devaluation,
the burden of this debt on Thailand rises substantially. The results for Indonesia presented
in Figure 13 are closer to those for Korea than those for Thailand.
b.  Changes in Risk Premia
The size of the risk premium on Thai government bonds has varied considerably
during the crisis, rising from around 0.9 percent before the crisis hit, to a peak of around
4.5 percent. Since we are using an annual model, we take an average and impose a shock
of 2.5 percent. While the only available data are for bonds of ten years to maturity, it
seems likely that bonds of other maturities would also be affected. Thus the shock is
represented as a permanent change in expectations about the risk premium. Key results
for the risk premium shock in Thailand are presented in Figure 14.
From the Figure, it is clear that many of the impacts are very similar to those for
the anticipated decline in productivity considered above. The nominal exchange rate
immediately depreciates, in this case by almost 25 percent. Investment falls sharply in
response to the increase in the cost of investment. Consumption falls even more sharply
because of the decline in wealth associated with the rise in interest rates. Real interest
rates rise sharply in the first year-- by over two percent-but  the increase then declines to
a little over one percent after five years as higher inflation rates reduce the real interest
rate. In the long run equilibrium, the real interest rate is 2.5 percent above its baseline
level.
The sharp falls in consumption and investment result in a rapid turnaround on the
trade and current account balances. The sharp increase in net exports causes a serious
short-term deterioration in the terms of trade/real exchange rate measure. The
improvement in the trade account is primarily due to reductions in the value of imports,
rather than to increases in the value of exports.
The reduction in real GDP resulting from this shock is relatively small both in the
short and the long run. This reduction is smaller than in the case of a fall in productivity
because the physical productivity of inputs remains the same. While the country becomes
29less competitive in the market for investment capital, this has a smaller adverse impact on
output than is the case for the productivity shock.
The recovery in the trade account is very rapid because of the sharp decline in
consumption and investment relative to GDP. This improvement in the trade account
occurs despite the substantial deterioration in the real effective exchange rate/terms of
trade index.
Nominal and real interest rates increase sharply in the first year. In subsequent
years, however, the nominal interest rate declines as the nominal exchange rate begins to
appreciate from its initially very depreciated level. During this adjustment period, real
interest rates at first decline, and then rise towards their long run equilibrium as the
exchange rate appreciation slows down.
The response of the Korean and Indonesian economies follow the same
qualitative  pattern as the Thai economy in their response to the risk premium shock. The
shock to the Korean economy is specified to be the same size as that for the Thai
economy, although data on the size of the risk premium during the crisis were not
available.
C.  Monetary Policy Responses
Once a serious crisis emerges, and the exchange rate depreciates, the likely
reaction of market participants is to anticipate that the authorities will, at some point,
increase the money supply. The initial impact of the exchange rate depreciation
associated with both the anticipated decline in productivity, and the heightened risk
premium, is to raise prices. If this price shock is not validated by the monetary
authorities, then interest rates will rise and output and employment are likely to fall, at
least temporarily. If monetary policy is relaxed substantially, as happened in Indonesia,
then, under floating rates, a substantial depreciation of the currency would be expected.
Anticipation of a future increase in the money supply will, however, lead to an
immediate depreciation of the exchange rate (Wilson 1979). This will, in turn, result in a
rise in the price level, and in wage rates. If the monetary policy shock does not, in fact,
eventuate, there is a risk of a serious downturn in the economy, as the higher price level
30reduces the real money supply and drives interest rates up, and increased wages create
competitiveness problems.
To analyze the issues involved in this case, we examine the case of an anticipated
relaxation of monetary policy in Thailand. While hard evidence is not available, it seems
extremely likely that market participants anticipated that the authorities would respond to
the crisis by increasing the money supply. This expectation presumably contributed to the
initial depreciation of the Baht. The realization that monetary policy would remain firm
may then have contributed to the substantial appreciation from February 1998.
Because of uncertainty about the extent of monetary policy relaxation anticipated
by the market, we examine a purely hypothetical 10 percent anticipated increase in the
money supply in Thailand. Figure 17(a) deals with the case where a monetary expansion
is anticipated in year 3, the second year of the crisis and presents its impact on both the
exchange rate and real GDP. Figure 17(b) then deals with the case where, during the first
year of the crisis (year 2), a monetary expansion is anticipated, but does not, in fact,
occur. This comparison uses the ability of the forward-looking G-Cubed model to deal
with anticipated future shocks.
From Figures 17(a) and 17(b), it is clear that the anticipated relaxation of
monetary policy causes a depreciation and stimulates output in the first year of the crisis.
If the monetary policy relaxation is, in fact, carried out (Figure 17(a)), there is a further
depreciation, and a further stimulus to output in the second year of the crisis. This
expansion might potentially offset some of the adverse impacts of the original shock. If,
despite expectations, the monetary policy expansion is not carried out in the second year
of the crisis, then Figure 17(b) points to a decline in output that year that is roughly twice
the size of the stimulus arising in the first year. Further, the contractionary effects of the
unrealized relaxation of monetary policy persist for a number of years as the exchange
rate appreciates and prices are bid down. The cumulative losses from an anticipated but
unrealized policy of monetary relaxation substantially outweigh the gains in the first year.
Further, they outweigh even the potential gains from an anticipated monetary expansion.
31Figure  17(a): Effects of an Anticipated  and Realized Money Supply Expansion
in Year 3
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32The choice between a monetary policy that validates some of the inflationary
impacts arising from devaluation is a difficult one. A policy that accommodates may
reduce the costs of foregone output, albeit at the cost of increasing inflation rates that
may be difficult to lower subsequently. An unyielding monetary policy stance will, as
observed earlier, result in high real interest rates and some loss of output. However, the
worst outcome is clearly one where the government's commitment to an unyielding
monetary policy stance is not regarded as credible. This experiment clearly highlights the
importance of policy credibility.
While monetary policy appears to have been relatively tight in Korea and
Thailand, monetary policy in Indonesia was loosened very substantially in late 1997. By
January 1998, M2 was 50 percent above its level in June of 1997. Figure 18 assesses the
consequences of a one off, unanticipated, increase of this magnitude on key economic
variables. The experiment is performed with the model in standard form, without taking
into account any impacts of the resulting exchange rate depreciation on the financial
performance of firms.
The first panel of Figure 18 shows that an unanticipated expansion of the money
supply would be expected to lead to a sharp increase in real consumption and investment
demand. The stimulus to investment is particularly large, at 25 percent. Real GDP also
increases, by about 10 percent. A consequence of the much greater increase in spending
than in income is a deterioration of 6 percent of GDP in the trade and current account
balances. Real interest rates rise in the first year by 0.5 percentage points, and by 0.7
percentage points in the second year, despite the increase in liquidity and the decline in
nominal interest rates.
33Figure  18:  Effects of a 50 Percent  Increase  in the Money Supply in Indonesia
Indonesia: GDP, Consumption and Investment  Indonesia: Trade and Current Account Balance
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Monetary  shook  of Indonesia  a-Monetary  shock of IndonesiaThe favorable short term impacts depicted in Figure 18 omit some of the
important adverse consequences of such an expansionary policy. Where the balance
sheets of firms contain substantial amounts of unhedged foreign exchange liabilities, as
appears to have been the case in Indonesia 4, devaluation increases the debt burden of
local firms and can cause an effective breakdown of a country's  financial markets. Where
such a devaluation comes on top of an initial devaluations associated with downward
revisions about the profitability of investment, and rising risk premia, even initially
strong firms can be driven into insolvency. As Mishkin (1998) points out, such a
combination of shocks seems to have been a major source of contraction both in the East
Asian crisis and in the Mexican crisis of 1994.
d.  Contraction Resulting from the Financial Crisis
In these experiments, we combine an anticipated long term decline in productivity
of the type considered earlier, with an immediate decline in productivity resulting from
the financial collapse. The shocks are calibrated to be broadly consistent with the declines
in output relative to the model baseline represented by current assessments of the output
levels in 1998. Without accounting for these initial declines in output from financial
sector distress, we have not been able to replicate the short term output declines relative
to the high rates of growth contained in the model baseline, and in pre-crisis projections.
For Thailand, a decline in total factor productivity of 6.5 percent results in a
decline in real GDP of roughly 10 percent relative to the model's baseline growth rate.
This decline increases, relative to the model's baseline, to over 15 percent in the second
year, a decline that would translate into close to zero overall growth in the second post-
crisis year.
This immediate nature of the decline in productivity, together with the larger
value of the long-run negative productivity shock (-6.5 percent rather than -5 percent)
results in larger short term declines in consumption, investment and output than in the
anticipated productivity shock considered earlier. In the long run, GDP again declines by
4 Chang  and  Velasco (1998,  Table 16)  estimate  that only  2.15 percent  of Indonesian  debt to BIS banks  was
denominated  in local currency.
35substantially more than the productivity shock as Thailand becomes less competitive in
international markets for investment goods. The decline in GDP is substantially larger
than the decline in GNP, consumption and investment. The depreciation of the nominal
effective exchange rate, at over 50 percent, goes a long way towards explaining the
observed decline in the value of the Baht which peaked at over 50 percent during the
course of the crisis. Inflation jumps by 20 percentage points, and interest rates rise by
only a little over five percent. The long term real interest rate actually falls slightly in the
first year, in contrast with the spike in real interest rates observed in the anticipated
productivity and risk premium experiments.
The adverse shock to the Korean economy required to match projections of the
output decline is substantially smaller (3 percent) than that required for Thailand (6.5
percent). This results in generally smaller impacts, although the pattern of all of the
effects is generally the same as in the case of Thailand.
The adverse shock to the Indonesian economy required to match likely
projections of the output impacts of the crisis is larger, at -8.0 percent, than that required
in Thailand or Korea. This contributes importantly to the larger fall in consumption,
investment and output in the Indonesian economy. The long run fall in output is very
substantial, at around 20 percent, relative to baseline. The trade and current account
balances improve-- initially by close to 20 percent of GDP. The trade balance change
remains positive for almost 15 years, and the current account change remains positive
throughout the projection horizon, reflecting the reduced need to service foreign debts.
The nominal real depreciation is over 30 percent with a decline in the terms of trade/real
exchange rate measure of almost 15 percent.
36Figure  19:  Impacts  of Output  Declines Resulting  from Financial  Crisis - Thailand
Thailand: GDP, Consumption and Investment  Thailand: Trade and Current Account Balance
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a.  The Yen-Dollar Exchange Rate
Changes in the yen-dollar exchange rate have frequently been viewed as having
significant impacts on trade and exchange rate outcomes for other East Asian countries
(Hoekman and Martin 1998). A major difficulty involved in testing this hypothesis is the
obvious endogeneity of the exchange rates. Clearly, the relationship between these two
rates and any outcome will depend upon the source of the shocks.
It seems highly plausible that the sharp appreciation of the US dollar relative to
the yen since 1995 is due to changes in expected returns to capital in these countries.
Assuming this to be the case, the consequences of an upward revision in expectations
about returns to capital in the United States, and a corresponding downward revision in
Japan were investigated. In Japan, the shock was a five percent decline in expected
productivity. In the USA, the shock was a five percent increase.
In this section, we examine a pair of asset market shocks that are sufficient to
cause the observed outcomes of a sharp decline in the yen and the Japanese stock market,
and the buoyancy observed in the US stock market and exchange rate. This experiment is
implemented by incorporating a five percent fall in expectations of productivity growth in
Japan over five years. In the US, a mirror-image increase in the productivity growth rate
is added.
Key results from this experiment are presented in Figure 22. A key feature is
sharp falls in real GDP, and consumption and investment spending in Japan, together
with a substantial increase in the trade and current account balances. The yen depreciates
sharply relative to the trade-weighted currencies of its trading partners, while the
currencies of the East Asian crisis countries depreciate relative to most currencies other
than the yen, but appreciate relative to the weighted average of their trading partners
because of the importance of the yen.
40Figure  22: Productivity  Shocks Causing Yen-Dollar Exchange  Rate Changes
Japan:  GDP,  Consumption  and  Investment  Japan: 14minal and Real  Eifective Exchange  Rates
o  4  I~  ---  - s  _  ,_  1  0
,eWt~~~~~~~~~~'  't  eOe0°0  e  X0  R  |Oo@,0  5  ...  "  -
-4  t  0 -
z  -6~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  1
10
*  ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~ ~~~~~  ~~~~~~~~-20
-l  12~a-  j  ,-  .m-a -a----u-  5  -25
-14  -30
.16  y  35
-18  _  -- ONR-40  _  - -N-F
Productivity shock causing Yen-Dollar exchange  rate changes  |  --- GWl  Productivity  shock  causing  Yen-Dollar exchange  rate  changes  |  .. R.
Japan:  Trade  and  CurrentAccount  Balance  Nominal Effective  Exchange  Ratesfor EastAsian Countries
2  _  s
1.5  X  |>  Ot¢3F  OeX@Xo  IOXeXN  Xa OXu
.°  t  -15  t
a  05~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
05  I  \  Xj -30  ---InttvvOi2
O  °l +III+-  -25  lr
C_OS ,  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~35  \,
1  F~.|TRDBAL  -40  ____  _  |  =I-JOpav
Productivity shock causing Yen-Dollar exchange rate changes  |  CABAL  Productivity  shock  causing  Yen-Dollar  exchange  rate chages  A 6.  Possible Policy Responses
a.  Temporary Japanese Fiscal Expansion
The next experiments involve fiscal policy responses in Japan. The first is a
temporary fiscal stimulus scaled to be consistent with the announced fiscal stimulus
package. Specifically, this package considered involves 1 percent of GDP spending on
durable manufactures, 1 percent of GDP spending on Non-Durable manufactures, 0.5
percent of GDP spending directly on employment, and a 2 percent tax cut. The temporary
stimulus is scheduled to last for two years and then to stop. The second experiment
involves the same stimulus but, in this case, specified to continue indefinitely.
Some key results for the temporary fiscal expansion experiment are presented in
Figure 23. From the first panel, it is clear that the expansion causes a significant increase
in total consumption demand-about  2.9 percent of GDP in the first year, declining to 1.6
percent in the second year. The stimulus to output is not free, the govermnent spending
must ultimately be paid for and in the model solution, this is done by allowing the
government to build up debt during the period of stimulus. This additional debt is
maintained over the medium term, with taxes raised gradually to cover the additional
interest servicing costs of this permanently higher stock of debt.
The initial stimulus to GDP of 1.2 percent of GDP, is smaller than the change in
the fiscal deficit, but still significant. The size of this stimulus depends heavily upon the
specification of the labor market as well as the impact on interest rates and real exchange
rates. In the past, the Japanese labor market has been viewed as being very flexible,
leaving little ability for fiscal policy to greatly affect output. The result presented here are
based on a less sanguine view of the Japanese labor market, in which nominal wages
respond to changes in expected inflation, past inflation and the gap between actual
employment and full employment (along the lines of an overlapping contracts model of
wage determination). The plot of GDI highlights one of the constraints on the
effectiveness of fiscal policy. The fiscal expansion causes a 5.2 percent reduction in gross
domestic investment, crowding out a significant part of the direct stimulus provided by
the fiscal expansion.  In addition, the fiscal stimulus appreciates the real exchange rate,
42which crowds out net exports (discussed below). In the year after the fiscal stimulus
package ends, output actually falls, with the need for the government to service the debt
acquired during the fiscal stimulus package acting as a brake on the economy's growth
prospects.
The fiscal expansion causes a sharp, if short lived, appreciation of the yen as
shown in the figure. Both the nominal and the real exchange rate appreciate by roughly
five percent in the first year. These appreciations are short-lived, with around half
wearing off by the second year. In the third year, the exchange rate actually depreciates
relative to the baseline. The fall in output in the third year of the experiment causes short
term interest rates to fall. During this period of low interest rates, the exchange rate must
be expected to appreciate if asset holders are to retain their dollar assets. The
overshooting depreciation is the mechanism that allows this arbitrage condition to be
satisfied.
The trade balance deteriorates by almost 1.5 percent of GDP in the first year
reflecting both a rise in demand for imports through stronger domestic demand but also
due to the temporary appreciation of the Yen. The deterioration in the trade balance
provides a small stimulus to Japan's trading partners. The current account deteriorates by
substantially less, because the fall in investment largely matches the decline in
government saving.
During the two years of the stimulus package, both the interest rate and the
inflation rate rise in Japan. Short-term real interest rates rise because the government
needs to issue debt to finance the temporary fiscal stimulus. Long term interest rates
change slightly because of the temporary nature of the financing requirements. The rise in
domestic demand also puts upward pressure on domestic inflation and therefore nominal
interest rates initially rise by more that real interest rates, The change in consumer prices
is larger than the rise in producer prices because of the appreciation of the Yen.
43Figure 23:  Temporary  Fiscal Stimulus in Japan
Japan: GDP, Consumption andInvestment 
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and current account balances in the crisis countries. The stimulus package can be
expected to have two impacts on exchange rates in the crisis countries. Its impact through
the trade account would be expected to be positive, stimulating the demand for the
exports of its trading partners and tending to appreciate the real exchange rate. The asset
market effect works in exactly the opposite direction. A rise in Japanese real interest rates
can be expected to put downward pressure on exchange rates in other countries. Since the
impact of Japan's expansion on world interest rates is quite significant, the asset market
effect outweighs the trade account impact. The exchange rates of all of the East Asian
crisis countries actually depreciate as capital flows into Japan to finance the additional
fiscal measures.
b. Permanent Japanese Fiscal Expansion
It might seem logical to think that a permanent fiscal expansion would have a
more powerful stimulatory effect than a temporary expansion. However, this need not be
the case once allowance is made for the need to fund the increase in government
expenditure and the consequences of this for asset markets.
In the Asia-Pacific G-Cubed model simulation, it turns out that the adverse asset
market impacts of sustained fiscal expansion outweigh its stimulatory impact right from
the beginning. In Figure 24, it is clear that the stimulus to consumption demand is very
small even in year one. This is because forward looking consumers recognize the future
financing cost to them of the increase in government spending. In particular this
simulation assumes that the permanent expansion of spending and cut in taxes leads to a
permanently larger stock of government debt. This large stock of debt is serviced by
gradually rising taxes but the stock of debt is not returned to the initial level of debt at
any time in the simulation horizon.
The impact of the permanent fiscal expansion on asset markets is much larger
than for the temporary fiscal expansion. The stock of government debt is expected to rise
much more in the future and real interest rates are expected to rise in anticipation of
45increased government borrowing. The future tax liabilities are much larger for the
permanent fiscal stimulus than for a temporary fiscal stimulus and therefore real interest
rates rise by more for the permanent fiscal expansion 5. Higher real interest rates in Japan
imply a stronger appreciation of the Yen.  The rise in real interest rates dampens private
investment expenditure in the short run and also dampens consumption expenditure
through liquidity constraints. In addition, the stronger exchange rate leads to a larger
crowding out of net exports as well in the case of the permanent versus temporary fiscal
expansion.
In the Asia Pacific G-Cubed model, a permanent fiscal stimulus is less
expansionary in the short run and more contractionary in the medium run because the
asset markets effect in the short run are much larger than the direct demand stimulus from
higher government spending or tax cuts.  The overall stimulus to Japanese GDP is also
considerably smaller than was the case in the temporary expansion.
The deterioration of Japan's trade balance-- the direct stimulus to the trade
accounts of the East Asian crisis countries-- is around 2 percent of GDP which is
substantially more than in the case of the temporary shock. This reflects the fact that the
real exchange rate change is larger and more permanent in the case of the permanent
fiscal expansion. Despite this apparently more positive stimulus to the rest of Asia, there
is also a larger rise in global real interest rates through a permanent fall in Japanese
saving which impacts negatively on net debtor economies in the region.
Overall these results demonstrate that a permanent fiscal expansion is actually
less expansionary for Japan than a temporary fiscal expansion because of the impact on
asset markets both within Japan and outside Japan.  The important distinction between
permanent and temporary fiscal changes and anticipated and unanticipated fiscal policy
changes in Japan is dealt with in McKibbin (1997). The impact of the fiscal policy shift
on countries outside Japan depends crucially on the extent of trade with Japan as well as
the net foreign asset position of each economy. In each case, a temporary fiscal stimulus
5Of  course  in a purely  Ricardian  world  this effect  would  not occur because  all the tax liabilities  would  be
internalized  without  a need  for interest  rate  changes
46Figure  24:  Permanent  Fiscal Stimulus  in Japan
Japan:  GDP,  Consumption  and Investment  Japan:  Nominal  and  Real Effective  Exchange  Rates
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c.  Fiscal Policy Responses in the Crisis Countries
An important issue in the policy debate about responses to the East Asian crisis is
the choice of fiscal policy settings. The initial fiscal policy settings in the crisis countries
were tight, providing much more flexibility than in countries where crises have been
precipitated by excessive fiscal and monetary policy expansion. The initial policy
responses involved further tightening, while subsequent adjustments have involved
relaxation of these constraints. The analysis presented here assumes that fiscal policy
changes can be made while holding other policy parameters, and particularly the money
supply, constant. If changes in the fiscal policy stance are interpreted as signalling
changes in other policy settings, then their impacts would be different, and would require
an analysis involving anticipated changes in the other policy instruments.
To investigate the effects of more relaxed fiscal policy settings, we consider a
relaxation of fiscal policy in Thailand through the implementation of a permanent tax cut
equal to two percent of GDP. The immediate impact of this policy change is, as shown in
Figure 25, a sharp increase in consumption demand. This increase in demand is almost 8
percent in the first year, and then declines gradually as the increase in taxes required to
fund the tax cut rises in line with the government's debt burden. Investment demand rises
very slightly, as does real GDP.
The small increase in real GDP resulting from the fiscal stimulus is a concern
given the sharp declines in output that have occurred in the crisis countries. As was noted
above, standard macro models do not appear to account for anything like the decline in
output that resulted from the crisis unless an additional shock to the financial system is
incorporated. There is thus a possibility that the small increase in output resulting from
the fiscal policy expansion understates the favorable impact of the fiscal policy stimulus.
Whether this is so depends upon how the fiscal policy expansion interacts with the
48Figure  25:  Permanent  Fiscal Stimulus in Thailand
Thailand: GDP, Consumption and Investment  Thailand:  Nominal  and Reai  Effeotive  Exchange  Rates
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balance, on domestic interest and exchange rates.
As is evident from the figures, the fiscal policy stimulus causes the trade and
current account balances to deteriorate sharply, offsetting to a minor extent the marked
improvements associated with the original financial shocks that set off the crisis. From
Figure 19, the initial improvement in the balance of trade resulting from the declines in
output was in the order of 25 percent of GDP, as against a deterioration of 3.5 percent
resulting from the fiscal expansion. This deterioration in the trade balance should not, of
itself, be a serious problem for adjustment unless market participants treat the outcome on
the trade balance as a signal of the extent of adjustment.
The fiscal stimulus also causes interest rates to increase by roughly 0.6 percentage
points. This increase will clearly worsen the pressure on heavily indebted firms, and
could worsen the pressures on the corporate and financial sectors.
The stimulus package, in the context of a fixed money supply, causes an
appreciation of almost six percent in the nominal effective exchange rate. This
strengthening would be beneficial to companies with debts denominated in foreign
currencies. Given the long delays frequently involved in corporate restructuring, and the
output problems resulting from the apparent lack of liquidity in Thailand (Dollar and
Hallward-Driemeier 1998), this appreciation might provide a stimulus to output that is
additional to that captured in the macroeconomic framework used in the model.
Certainly, over the range in which it can be used, fiscal stimulus seems preferable to
monetary contraction as a means of strengthening the exchange rate.
6.  Conclusions
There remains considerable uncertainty about the causes of the shocks that have
recently hit some of the most dynamic of the East Asian economies. In this paper, we
have examined a number of the shocks that have been identified as possible causes of the
crisis. The shocks examined included some of the "usual suspects" involved in earlier
adjustment crises, such as terms of trade deteriorations and unsustainable currency pegs.
50Of the three most hard-hit countries, only Korea appeared to have suffered a
sizable terms of trade deterioration in a reasonably short period, and this was probably at
least partly compensated for by technical change in the production of products such as
semiconductors.
The much-criticized policy of pegging nominal exchange rates to the dollar also
seems unlikely to have created the level of pressures needed to bring on a full-fledged
adjustment crisis of the type observed. We decomposed changes in the effective
exchange rates of each country into a component due to changes in the country's rate
against the dollar and a component due to changes in the US dollar's value against the
country's trading partners. Only in Thailand did the US dollar appear to have appreciated
significantly against trading partner currencies and, even there, the appreciation was
relatively modest.
It seems unlikely that changes of the magnitude observed in exchange rates or the
terms of trade could, alone, have caused an adjustment crisis of this magnitude. It
remains possible, however, that they acted as triggers for a crisis by, for example,
triggering changes in expectations about outcomes in financial markets 6. Similarly, the
exchange rate mechanism could have been insufficiently flexible to allow the sort of
adjustment needed in response to a crisis emanating elsewhere in the economy.
The declines in the stockmarkets of Thailand and Korea from early 1996 are
suggestive of another potential cause of the shock. In Thailand, it appears that
expectations of future growth in corporate sector returns fell in early 1996, when the
price-earnings ratio for this market began to fall. In Korea, actual returns on equity began
to fall about this time, and stock prices to fall in line with this decline. Such a decline in
asset valuations would be expected to result in major shifts in portfolios that could have
major economic consequences.
Once such an asset market shock began to be felt, its consequences would likely
be compounded by secondary shocks associated with the abrupt shift to floating rates,
concerns about the credibility of government policies, weaknesses in financial sectors,
and inadequacies in the mechanisms for corporate restructuring and liquidation. Some of
6 In another  paper, McKibbin  (1998)  argues  that an increase  in US interest  rates in March  1997  triggered  a
portfolio  adjustment.  This  issue is not examined  in the current  paper.
51these problems were reflected in increases in the risk premia on Thai and Indonesian
securities. Others are evident only in the observed declines in output in the region.
The G-Cubed model provides some important insights into the likely responses of
the economy to these shocks. Declines in the expected growth rate of returns on
investment resulting from anticipated declines in the growth of productivity were found
to set off a major set of adjustments including sharp currency depreciations, declines in
consumption and investment, and rapid improvement in the trade and current account
balances. While the impacts on Thailand of this experiment were large, the spillovers
through economic channels onto the currencies of the other countries were small and
even positive in the case of Korea. Clearly this suggests that contagion did not arise
through direct trade or capital account linkages.
Increases in the risk premium on a country's  securities were found to reinforce
most of the impacts of the diminished expectations of future productivity growth.
Increases in risk premia of the magnitude observed for Thailand and Indonesia resulted in
additional nominal depreciations in the order of 25 percent in Thailand and 20 percent in
Indonesia and, by reducing consumption and investment, provided a strong stimulus to
the external accounts.
The response of monetary policy is clearly important. Some degree of monetary
expansion was probably anticipated given the rise in prices created by the initial
depreciations. Such a policy relaxation would stimulate output, albeit at the expense of a
further exchange rate depreciation. Such an anticipated policy of monetary expansion
would cause an exchange rate depreciation and have a modest stimulatory impact even
before it was actually implemented. If, however, monetary relaxation was anticipated but
does not eventuate, output losses would be likely to exceed the gains in the initial period.
This result highlights the need for policy credibility-- if a government promises to
maintain a tight monetary policy but its commitments are not taken to be credible, the
outcome is likely to be worse than with either an anticipated monetary expansion or a
credible commitment to tight monetary policies.
The significant observed declines in output in the region make it clear that the
problems in the financial and business sectors are having a sharply adverse impact on the
productivity of the economy. This immediate decline in productivity reinforces the effect
52of the anticipated declines in the productivity of investments identified as a primary cause
of the crisis. Combining this adverse productivity shock with key secondary shocks, such
as the.monetary policy response in Indonesia, allows us to capture some of the key
features of the response to the crisis in these countries.
Several shocks involving developments in Japan are considered because of the
importance of Japan for the region. The first is a decline in expected returns on capital in
Japan and a similar increase in expected returns in the USA designed to broadly replicate
the changes in their exchange rates. These shocks produce the expected declines in the
Japanese exchange rate, and in the current account, but appear to produce relatively small
changes in the exchange rates of the other East Asian countries. Two experiments
involving Japanese fiscal stimulus of the type announced in the April 1998 package. The
temporary fiscal stimulus is found to be more effective than a permanent fiscal. Both
cause the nominal exchange rate to appreciate in Japan, but to depreciate in the East
Asian crisis countries.
The final experiment considered is a fiscal policy stimulus in Thailand achieved
by a permanent tax cut equal to 2 percent of GDP. This stimulates consumption, but
crowds out investment, so that the net stimulus to output is relatively small. The trade
account deteriorates. There is a relatively large exchange rate appreciation, and a modest
increase in real interest rates.
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